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adversely impact on the image of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military services concerned. The potential for problems is further increased by today's world of almost instantaneous global communications and electronic journalism. While each of the military services operate similar, but independent casualty systems for their respective services, there is no DoD agency acting as a "central clearing house" for casualty affairs. Our most recent experiences involving mass or multi-service casualties, such as Beirut, Gander and Grenada, have presented DoD with problems in responding to governmental and public casualty related inquiries. Considering that the military establishment is a vast community of over 5 million people and recognizing the nature of the mission of DoD, it is inevitable that military personnel will continue to be involved in multi-service casualty situations both in peace and in combat. A standard casualty reporting and assistance program is essential to ensure that our military members and their families receive empathetic and humane care uniformly across the services; that our military and civilian leaders are promptly and accurately apprised of casualty situations; and that every possible accounting of our people is aggressively pursued. Establishment of a joint casualty operations center or agency at JCS level appears to be the most effective approach to the realization of these objectives. Establishment of such an agency is not only operationally feasible, but in recognition of increasing congressional pressure for more "jointness" among the services, the timing for such an initiative has never been better.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**CASUALTY REPORTING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
IN THE MILITARY SERVICES:
IS THERE A NEED FOR JOINT CASUALTY OPERATIONS?**

An Individual Essay

by

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**US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Juan I. Chavez, LTC, AG

TITLE: Casualty Reporting and Assistance Programs in the Military Services: Is There a Need for Joint Casualty Operations?

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Casualty reporting and assistance programs (i.e., casualty reporting; notification of next-of-kin; survivor assistance; and mortuary affairs) are administrative functions performed by all military services, both during peace and wartime, that are unmatched in importance, sensitivity, and immediacy. If not managed well and executed with the utmost accuracy and timeliness they have far-reaching effects on the morale of the military and civilian populace; and, adversely impact on the image of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military services concerned. The potential for problems is further increased by today's world of almost instantaneous global communications and electronic journalism. While each of the military services operate similar, but independent casualty systems for their respective services, there is no DoD agency acting as a "central clearing house" for casualty affairs. Our most recent experiences involving mass or multi-service casualties, such as Beirut, Gander and Grenada, have presented DoD with problems in responding to governmental and public casualty related inquiries. Considering that the military establishment is a vast community of over 5 million people and recognizing the nature of the mission of DoD, it is inevitable that military personnel will continue to be involved in multi-service casualty situations both in peace and in combat. A standard casualty reporting and assistance program is essential to ensure that our military members and their families receive empathetic and humane care uniformly across the services; that our military and civilian leaders are promptly and accurately apprised of casualty situations; and that every possible accounting of our people is aggressively pursued. Establishment of a joint casualty operations center or agency at JCS level appears to be the most effective approach to the realization of these objectives. Establishment of such an agency is not only operationally feasible, but in recognition of increasing congressional pressure for more "jointness" among the services, the timing for such an initiative has never been better.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this essay is to examine the casualty systems of each of the services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) and recent incidents involving mass or multi-service casualties to determine the feasibility and necessity of establishing a joint casualty operations agency at JCS level to serve as the focal point for coordination of casualty reporting and assistance policies and actions for all services during peace and wartime; for delineating casualty reporting responsibilities and procedures during joint combat operations; and, to act as a "central clearing house" for all casualty related matters for all services.

GENERAL

Each of the military services operate their own internal casualty reporting and assistance systems. The casualty reporting and assistance infrastructures are tailored to their service unique missions and organization, but their modus operandi are very similar. Moreover, the casualty reporting and assistance policies of all the services stem from a common philosophy of ensuring accurate and timely reporting and recording of all casualties; and, prompt notification of the next-of-kin (NOK) in a dignified, humane, empathetic, and professional manner. All services also share to some extent,

common terms, communications systems, reporting formats and forms. Each of the services have established their programs pursuant to DoD Instruction 7730.63, "Reports on Active Duty Military Personnel Casualties in Official Combat Areas and in Noncombat Areas", dated 26 August 1982; and, DoD Instruction 1330.9, "Military Personnel Casualties Notification and Assistance to Next of Kin", dated 23 March 1973.

SYSTEMS DESCRIPTIONS

Responsibilities

At DoD level, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ADC(C)) exercises staff supervision of the casualty reporting system,¹ while the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) (ASD(FM&P)) has staff responsibility for casualty notification and assistance to the NOK.² Casualty reporting is a command responsibility in all the military services. Notification and assistance to NOK are responsibilities exercised by the services on a geographical area basis within their service. Common to all services is that these functions have been combined under the staff supervision of the principal personnel staff officer at all levels.

Organization

DoD Instruction 7730.63 designates the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Washington Headquarters Services, an ASD(C) activity, as,

"...the focal point for the collection, processing, and dissemination of casualty statistics."

It further directs the heads of the military services to maintain an organizational capability to collect and report casualty information in an accurate and timely manner. It specifically tasks each military service to designate one office to provide all casualty reports, but in no way limits the number of offices within each military service that may be required.³

DoD Instruction 1300.9, on the other hand, sets forth the general policy of the DoD that,

"...in the event a military member becomes a casualty while on active duty, the next of kin of that member be notified as promptly as possible in a dignified, humane, and understanding manner."

It further directs that in all casualty cases involving death or missing person status, that notification will be made in person by a uniformed representative designated by the military service concerned, unless unusual circumstances preclude such procedure. Moreover, it directs that casualty assistance to NOK will be provided. Section VI states:

"In appropriate casualty cases such as death, missing, missing in action, or captured, the military services concerned will appoint an assistance officer, who will personally contact the next of kin within 24 hours following initial notification. He will to the extent the next of kin desires, provide guidance and assistance with such matters as burial arrangements, claims for monetary benefits, dependent transportation and transportation of household goods, dependent benefits, and special financial and legal problems arising from the serviceman's casualty status as are pertinent to the particular case. The assistance officer will maintain contact with the next of kin until the casualty is finally resolved."⁴

Based on the foregoing, each of the military services have designed their casualty reporting and assistance systems to best support their organization and missions. At the military service headquarters level, each operate a casualty operations center or agency where it controls the information from casualty reports and from mortuary channels which drive the processes of NOK notification and casualty assistance. All of the services casualty operations centers are located in the Washington, D.C. area with the exception of the Air Force which is located at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas.

Conceptually, all four military services are organized similarly to exercise their casualty systems responsibilities of reporting, NOK notification, and survivor assistance. The systems are characterized by a network of casualty area commands located at major CONUS installations and overseas commands providing casualty reporting, NOK notification and casualty assistance on an area basis. Essentially what this means is that a casualty area command within whose area a casualty occurs assumes responsibility, and a casualty area command within whose area the NOK reside provides notification and survivors assistance. These casualty area commands are responsive to their respective military service headquarters in Washington, D.C. via their casualty operations centers where the flow of casualty information is monitored and controlled. Lastly, functional proponency for the casualty system falls within the purview of the personnel staff organization of each of the services.⁵⁻⁸

Procedures

While a casualty may most commonly be thought of as a death, reportable casualties include such cases as wounded, missing, detained, and seriously or very seriously ill. Specific casualty services may vary somewhat depending on the nature of the casualty, but major differences in procedures depend on whether a casualty occurs overseas or in CONUS.

Procedures for submission of casualty reports, verification of casualty data, notification to NOK, appointment of casualty assistance officers and the like, are also generally the same in all military services.⁹ Nevertheless, there is still a need for standardization of policies and procedures among the military services to ensure that NOK of military service members are provided uniform treatment. The following are but a few examples of differences among the services:¹⁰

- o The Air force hand delivers a letter upon initially notifying NOK which gives the same information regarding the casualty incident as is provided by the notification officer. The other services do not use a letter upon initial notification. The Army uses only a mailgram following initial (personal) notification.

o The Air Force separates casualty assistance from mortuary affairs at all levels. The Army combines casualty assistance and mortuary affairs at the headquarters level. The Navy separates casualty assistance from mortuary (decedent) affairs at all levels with mortuary matters handled under the Navy's medical branch. The Marine Corps combines casualty and mortuary affairs using Navy decedent affairs assets.

o The Army, Air Force and Marine Corps pay and allowances entitlements to NOK are authorized to date of presumptive finding of death. The Navy halts pay and entitlements effective the date of service member's absence.

Standardization of policies and procedures in an area of great urgency and sensitivity in itself argues for a joint casualty system. It is conceivable that two family members of different military services may die in the same incident and the NOK is treated differently by the military services concerned. This scenario would certainly present some difficult and embarrassing problems to the DoD and yet the potential for its occurrence during joint combat operations is increasing.

LESSONS LEARNED

Perhaps the most compelling argument for jointness is the need to plan for casualty operations during joint combat

operations and for dealing with tragedies involving mass or multi-service casualties. Our recent experiences during Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, the terrorist bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, and the airplane crash in Gander, Newfoundland all revealed some major problems in the casualty systems of the services that could have been prevented or minimized through a joint casualty operations system.

Grenada

Most, if not all, of the casualty related problems that came out of Grenada can be attributed to a lack of planning as it pertained to casualty reporting and handling. The operation was a joint, JCS operation under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT). The Army component (or ARFOR) was the United States Army Forces Command. The major units were the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d Airborne Division, and battalions of the 75th Rangers.

After-action reports of the operation revealed that apparently there was a CINCLANT-published operation plan, but Army elements at HQDA and ARFOR levels (at least in the G-1/personnel community) had neither seen the operation plan nor participated in its preparation. Also, no implementing plans were published. A CINCLANT point of contact stated that the joint plan simply directed the military services to use "normal service procedures and policies for the reporting of casualties." A universal finding was that personnel planners were given no opportunity for input to the operation plans. The reason

repeatedly cited was operation secrecy and urgency.¹¹ As the Adjutant General (AG) of 82d Airborne Division at the time, the author can indeed attest to the total absence of guidance concerning casualty reporting.

Moreover, because of the low priority in the air flow the AG of the 82d Airborne Division was unable to get a casualty team on the ground until the third day of the operation. Therefore, the initial casualty reports received at home station (Ft Bragg, NC) were extremely sketchy, most of them coming in through the operational radio net via tactical satellite communications. An inordinate amount of time was spent on the radio trying to verify casualty data received during the first 36 to 48 hours of the operation. Consequently, when the first two men of the AG casualty team arrived in country, they worked continuously for approximately 48 hours just verifying and completing previously submitted fragmentary casualty reports, tracking down remains of KIA, and determining medical disposition of the wounded.

The medical evacuation and graves registration functions were not planned either. The wounded were being evacuated initially to the Naval Hospital at Roosevelt Rhodes Naval Air Station, Puerto Rico and from there to various military hospitals throughout CONUS as determined by the Armed Forces Medical Regulating Office. In the most seriously wounded cases, soldiers were medically evacuated to Naval ships off-shore until their conditions could be stabilized prior to further evacuation. Just

trying to keep track of the wounded through the medical evacuation system to determine their condition and ultimate disposition proved to be an administrative nightmare, eventually necessitating the dispatch of casualty liaison officers to various hospitals throughout CONUS.

Since the wounded were being evacuated to Roosevelt Rhodes, remains of KIA were also moved there although there were no mortuary facilities at Roosevelt Rhodes. As a result of the lack of planning, the standard systems were not used and function operators improvised to create a viable, on-the-spot system that met the need of the moment. A more detailed examination of the workings of the three key aspects of the system (reporting, notification, and graves registration/disposition of remains) clearly shows the lack of planning for and execution of the prescribed casualty systems.¹²

Battlefield reporting of casualties did not occur according to standing operating procedures (SOPs) during the first 36 to 48 hours of the operation, and there was no AG to receive, control and process reports at "division level" on the ground. There was no reporting channel above division level in the area of operations during the initial stages of the operation. Casualty reports were not received at the departmental level through a planned, systemic reporting channel. Rather, reports were received from various sources -- hospitals, the Dover AFB Mortuary, operational channels, etc.¹³

Notification of NOK was accomplished essentially as normal procedures dictate; however, the NOK of wounded cases did receive telephonic notification, vice telegram, and all cases had to be monitored to a degree far beyond that envisioned by regulation or SOPs due primarily to the intense public and private attention focused on the operation. Because of the rapidity with which information is transmitted and because of the lack of a reporting system, there were situations in which NOK learned about wounded cases before the military services could make official notification.¹⁴

A normal graves registration function was not performed. Remains were not identified or prepared in the overseas area as would have been expected. For the first time remains and personal effects were moved directly from the battlefield to a CONUS mortuary where functions (identification, preparation, disposition of personal effects) not normally assigned to that activity had to be accomplished in addition to the mortuary's normal functions of final preparation of remains, escort arrangements, and shipments. While the system was followed once remains had been identified, the added functions, coupled with the no-notice nature of the operation, taxed the capabilities of the mortuary facility and the Army's casualty operations center. Further, the need to accomplish the added functions of identifying the remains gave the appearance of delayed processing and shipment from Dover.¹⁵

There were many other problems and many lessons learned that came out of Grenada vis-a-vis casualty reporting and handling, all attributable to the lack of meaningful joint planning to deal with the issues of casualty reporting and graves registration/disposition of remains. Personnel planners at all levels must be included in the planning so that responsibilities and reporting channels are clearly delineated and understood in order for the military services to implement their plans effectively. The lack of planning leads naturally to the absence of a functioning system during combat operations as we learned in Grenada.

Because of the inter-dependency of the military services, it is safe to assume that future contingencies are going to be joint operations inevitably resulting in multi-service casualties. While this premise is sufficient to justify joint casualty operations and all that it implies, mass casualty situations during peacetime also argue strongly for a joint casualty system.

Mass Casualty Incidents

Within a 26-month period the United States experienced two tragic mass casualty situations -- the terrorist bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1983 which resulted in the death of 241 Marine, Navy and Army service members;¹⁶ and the airplane crash in Gander, Newfoundland on 12

December 1985 resulting in the death of 248 soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division returning to Fort Campbell, Kentucky from a 6-month peacekeeping mission to the Sinai.¹⁷

In both instances the functions of casualty reporting, NOK notification, survivor assistance, and disposition of remains were handled by the military services concerned in an admirable fashion despite a multitude of problems. Again, many of the problems encountered could have been prevented or minimized under an integrated or joint casualty system. For instance, the problems experienced by the Marine Corps during the Beirut incident were identical to those the Army went through during the Gander tragedy just 2 years later. It is not necessary to enumerate all of the problems experienced by the Marine Corps and the Army as a result of these two mishaps, but it is useful to examine some.

First, because of the shear volume of casualties, the casualty and mortuary systems were overtaxed in each instance. During the Beirut incident, the Army augmented the Marine Corps by dispatching a contingent of its casualty and memorial affairs experts to Frankfurt, Germany where the bodies were being evacuated to for identification and preparation. Coincidentally, two days later the Grenada operation was launched and the Army was caught short.¹⁸ Again, had there been some joint planning for the Grenada operation, this situation could have been avoided.

The staffs of the casualty operations center and mortuary had to be substantially augmented in order to cope with the crisis. While these augmentees performed superbly, they had to be trained and they were limited to specific functions. A joint casualty operations agency manned with a joint staff of casualty and memorial affairs experts can harness its resources to handle a crisis situation with limited augmentation, and no degradation of expertise. Working in a joint integrated casualty system, with standard policies and procedures allows the necessary flexibility and simplicity to deal with a mass or multi-service casualty crisis.

Second, the Marine Corps had considerable difficulty in making positive identification of the dead from Beirut because alternate methods of identification such as personnel, medical and dental records were lost or destroyed in the bombing.¹⁹ A proposal to go to a backup system of identification using dental panographic x-rays (PANOREX) was submitted by the military services shortly after the Beirut tragedy only to get bogged down in the DoD bureaucracy for two years.²⁰ As fate might have it, the airplane that crashed in Gander was also carrying the personnel, medical and dental records of those who perished in the accident. With still no backup system of identification, the Army went through the same problems the Marine Corps did. Within two weeks of the Gander crash, the PANOREX proposal was rushed through and approved by DoD for immediate implementation, albeit too late to help the Gander situation.²¹

Third, it was learned during the Gander tragedy that a single casualty operations center/agency must be in charge of operations, continuing earlier coordination with other supporting organizations in a crisis management environment. The magnitude of the loss of so many soldiers at one time and the immediate news coverage resulted in numerous Department of the Army (DA) agencies activating contingency cells that almost immediately implemented changes to existing and well practiced procedures. Casualty area commanders listed this as their number one problem during the first ten days. It was not clear who was responsible for what or who was in charge. The continuous flood of message traffic providing not only guidance, but taskings contained errors or misinformation, yet there was no point of contact identified in some messages for the correct information. In some cases HQDA staff officers were passing individual taskers to Survivor Assistance Officers (SAOs) directly, leaving the casualty area commanders out of the picture. This was frustrating to SAOs and rendered the casualty area commanders unprepared for any criticism for events taken out of their hands.²² This situation created a great deal of confusion and inefficiencies resulting in undue embarrassment to the Army and DoD, and compounded the anxiety of surviving family members.

Fourth, both the Beirut and Gander incidents surfaced the need for a joint casualty data base for accurate and timely

verification of casualty data. All services are currently using the DD Form 93 (Record of Emergency Data) or some variation of it to maintain these data. Much of the information on this record is perishable thus requiring service members to constantly update it -- a problem all services have been unsuccessful in resolving. It is estimated that at least 30% of the Army's records of emergency data are out of date at any given time. The after-action report on the Gander tragedy revealed that 40% of the records of the soldiers who died in the crash were not current.²³ Since the field record copies were lost in both instances the tedious process of verifying casualty data was further exacerbated, necessitating the services to go to several sources to piece information together. A joint casualty data base also serves the purpose of maintaining and providing accurate, consistent and timely information on casualties to government officials, the news media and other sources demanding this type of information.

As a result of the casualty related problems during Beirut, Grenada and Gander, a great deal of concern has been focused on the effectiveness of our casualty systems and the need for a joint effort in this important area. Several long overdue initiatives have sprung up to address some of the problems discussed.

In February 1985 the Army, on its own initiative, hosted an inter-service casualty operations/memorial affairs meeting in Washington, D.C., the purpose of which was to:²⁴

- o Establish direct channels of communication among services to define casualty and memorial affairs problems and issues of mutual concern.
- o Establish inter-service compatibility on problems and issues in preparation for seeking resolutions from outside agencies such as the DoD.
- o Establish a foundation for joint services action planning.

During this initial meeting each of the four services briefed their casualty systems, and the similarities and differences in policies were discussed. It was agreed by all attendees that since casualty affairs responsibilities are identical among all services, that direct lines of communications among services should be continued in order to discuss and attempt to resolve common mission problems. Other issues surfaced during the initial and subsequent meetings included:²⁵

- o The need for DoD guidance on casualty reporting policies.

- o The need for standard procedures for reporting casualties.
- o The need for joint/common terms and definitions for all services.
- o The need for standard reports/common language for all services.
- o Reporting and notification procedures during joint operations; notification methods across the spectrum of conflict; consideration of one service assuming casualty reporting responsibility during joint service operations.

There were several more issues and problems of mutual concern addressed during these meetings, but the above listed ones clearly illustrate from the military services' point of view the desirability, and most importantly, the need for joint casualty operations. These ad hoc meetings have proved so beneficial that the services have continued meeting in this joint forum on a regular basis.²⁶

As a result of the services' initiative and actions emanating from their joint conferences, the DoD is now taking a more active interest in the whole question of joint casualty operations. One of the most promising and much needed DoD actions is the drafting of a DoD regulation which is currently

being staffed among the services. The proposed regulation will supersede the two existing DoD directives dealing with casualty matters (i.e., DoD Instructions 1300.9 and 7730.63) which in essence combines responsibility for casualty reporting and NOK notification under a single DoD agency -- the ASD(FM&P). Moreover, it charges the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically the J-1, with the following responsibilities:²⁷

- o Be the focal point for all joint operational procedures and develop operational policy involving casualty reporting during peace and war.
- o Assign executive agency/administrative agency responsibilities in joint operational areas and appoint lead agencies in emergency/contingency/mass casualty incidents involving personnel of more than one military service.
- o Develop implementation/planning guidance to the military services, specified and unified commands, to ensure uniform handling of personnel casualty operations.

The proposed regulation also formalizes the inter-service joint casualty and memorial affairs conferences initiated by the Army by providing for the establishment of a permanent Armed Forces Casualty Advisory Board. The board would be charged with the responsibility for developing and recommending broad policy guidance, including proposing goals for the military departments

in order to ensure uniform policy regarding the care of military members and their families and to insure accurate reporting and accounting for the status of military members regarding mission accomplishment. The specific board functions as outlined in the proposed regulation are:²⁸

- o Recommend broad policy for coordination with the military departments and consideration/approval by the ASD(FM&P).
- o Recommend uniform operational procedures to be coordinated within the military departments and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- o Recommend basic responsibilities and executive agency roles to be considered and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint operations.
- o Review major disaster and contingency responses to casualty situations to ensure adequacy of existing policies and procedures.

CONCLUSIONS

- o The casualty systems of the military services are very similar and therefore lend themselves to integration at the service headquarters level.

- o There is a need for standardization of policies and procedures to ensure uniform treatment of military members and their families regardless of service.
- o There is a need for more clarity and frequency of guidance from DoD because most casualty related matters are governed by law and the military services do not interpret them the same in all cases.
- o The Grenada operation revealed a total lack of planning at the JCS level and below in the area of casualty reporting and handling during joint combat operations.
- o The casualty operations centers/agencies of the military services are inadequately staffed and equipped to efficiently handle crisis situations involving mass casualty situations. An automated joint casualty data base is an essential prerequisite for efficient operations.
- o There is a need for a joint casualty operations center or agency to serve as the focal point and "central clearing house" for all casualty matters during mass and multi-service casualty situations during peace and wartime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- o That the staffing, approval and publication of the draft DoD regulation be expedited.
- o That the casualty systems of all military services be standardized to the maximum degree possible commensurate with their missions and organization; and, be integrated at the service headquarters level.
- o That a joint casualty operations center or agency under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-1) be activated and jointly manned and located in the National Capital Region. Further, that it be equipped with a joint casualty data base using a modified DEERS (Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System) as its foundation.
- o That each of the military services continue providing notification and casualty assistance to the NOK of their own service members in keeping with their long-standing philosophies of taking care of their own.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 7730.63, 26 August 1982 (hereafter referred to as "DoD Instruction 7730.63").
2. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 1300.9, 23 March 1973 (hereafter referred to as "DoD Instruction 1300.9").
3. "DoD Instruction 7730.63", pp. 1-3.
4. "DoD Instructiion 1300.9", pp. 2-3.
5. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-8-1, 18 September 1986 (hereafter referred to as "AR 600-8-1").
6. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Regulation 30-25, 12 September 1984 (hereafter referred to as "AFR 30-25").
7. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual 15560 (hereafter referred to as "NAVPERSMAN").
8. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order P3040.4A, subject: Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual, 12 February 1973 (hereafter referred to as "MARCORCASPROMAN").
9. "AR 600-8-1", "AFR 30-25", "NAVPERSMAN", and "MARCORCASPROMAN".
10. U.S. Department of tthe Army, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, Memorandum, DAPC-PEC, subject: Joint Services Casualty Meeting, 6-8 February 1985, 7 March 1985 (hereafter referred to as "JSCM Memo").
11. U.S. Department of the Army, The Casualty and Memorial Affairs Task Force, Office of the Adjutant General, Casualty and Memorial Affairs Systems Review, 9 December 1983, Vol. I, p. III-1.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. III-2.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, After-Action Report - Lebanon Bombing Casualty Handling Procedures, p. iii.
17. U.S. Department of the Army, After-Action Report Following Gander, Newfoundland Tragedy, 21 March 1986, p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "AAR Gander").

18. Telephonic interview with Richard Landis, LTC, Chief, Casualty Operations Center, U.S. Military Personnel Center, 27 February 1987 (hereafter referred to as "Landis Interview").
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. "AAR Gander", Tab C, p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 37.
24. "JSCM Memo".
25. Ibid.
26. "Landis Interview".
27. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Regulation Unnumbered (Draft), undated, Chapter 1, pp. 2-4.
28. Ibid., Chapter 6, pp. 1-3.